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I.  Introduction 
Aggregate  concentration is conventionally measured  as  the  share of an 
economic variable  such as  value  added  or assets held by  the  largest firms  in  a 
sector or  the  economy  as  a  whole. l  Other measures  focus  on  the distribution 
of  a  relevant economic variable over  the  entire population of firms. 2  Both 
types  of measures  implicitly assume  that firms  are  independently  owned  and 
operated,  having only market  contact with each other.  They  are  flawed  as  a 
means  of measuring  the relative  importance  of large scale enterprise to  the 
extent that top  firms  are not  independent but are linked by  interfirm 
organizational structures. 
This  paper presents  an alternative measure  of aggregate  concentration 
based on the network clique,  or group  of related firms,  rather  than the  firm 
as  the unit of observation.  Firms  are associated in cliques based on  the 
number  and  intensity of the  interlocking directors  they maintain with other 
firms.  An  application to  the  agribusiness  sector suggests  that conventional 
measures  may  underestimate  aggregate  concentration by  15%  to  40%. 
lThis  is  commonly  referred to  as  CRK  where  K  is  the  number  of  top  firms 
included in the  measure  (e.g.,  CR100).  Studies using this measure  include 
White  (1981),  Shepherd  (1982),  Weiss  (1983),  and  Hughes  and Kumar  (1984). 
2These  include  the Herfindahl-Hirschman  Index  (H-index);  the U-index 
proposed by Davies  (1980);  the  Hannah  and  Kay  (1977)  family  of  indexes  based 
on  a  numbers  equivalent of  the  summation of individual  firm market  shares  to 
the nth power,  where  n  does  not  equal  one;  and  the Hart  and  Prais  (1956)  and 
Prais  (1976)  variance of logarithms  of firms'  sizes.  For  a  discussion of 
these  measures  see Curry  and George  (1983). 
1 II.  The  Network  Clique  as  Unit of Observation 
Contact between  firms  at levels  above  that of firm  management  is 
extensive .  This  interaction occurs  primarily through  families  and  companies 
that are  large  stockholders  in the  firms  and  through  interlocking directors 
who  sit on  more  than one  board of directors.  Herman  (1981),  Kotz  (1978),  and 
a  U.S.  Senate  study  (1974),  for  example,  found  many  families  and  companies 
that hold significant blocks  of stock in multiple  firms.  These  multiple 
holders  are  frequently financial  institutions  that manage  large pools  of 
pension funds. 
Multiple  stockholdings  are often reflected in patterns  of interlocking 
membership  on boards  of directors  (Herman  (1981),  Kotz  (1978)) .  Interlocking 
is  a  more  formal  mode  of contact than stockholding since  regular board 
meetings  provide  an  on-going  forum  for  discussion.  Typically,  membership  on 
boards  includes  the  firm's  top  managers  and representatives of large 
shareholders,  lenders,  suppliers,  buyers,  and others with an interest in the 
firm.  Under  Section 8  of the  Clayton Act,  direct competitors  are barred  from 
sitting on each other's boards.  Mintz  and  Schwartz  (1985) ,  Mizruchi  (1982), 
Herman  (1981),  and  Dooley  (1969)  document  the extensive degree  of interlocking 
among  American firms.  These  interlocks establish a  network of contacts  that 
has been remarkably stable over  time. 
For measures  of aggregate concentration,  the key  issue raised by this 
network of contacts  is  the  degree  of integration of decision making  among 
firms  it represents.  Such  integration,  like multimarket contact  among  firms 
(Scott 1982),  is likely to  lead to  poorer market performance  as  competition is 
weakened.  On  the  one  hand,  the  resource  dependency  school  argues  that 
managers  choose board members  who  are representatives of organizations  that 
2 have  resources  the  firm wants  access  to.  By  placing  them  on  the board,  the 
managers  in effect coopt  the  representative's home  organization  (see,  e.g. , 
Burt  (1980),  Pfeffer and  Nowak  (1976),  Pfeffer  (1972)).  According  to  this 
school,  the  existing network of contacts  is not substantial because it is an 
artifact of the  individual  firm's  autonomous  choice  of directors. 
On  the  other hand,  the  interest group  school  argues  that organizations 
that possess  important resources,  such as  financial  institutions that control 
access  to  credit,  demand  seats  on  firms'  boards  of directors  (see,  e.g., 
Mizruchi  (1982),  Kotz  (1978)).  These  seats are  a  quid pro  quo  by which  the 
outside  institution acquires  a  formal  voice  in the  firm's  decision making.  In 
this case,  patterns  of contact indicate significant integration of decision 
making  among  related firms. 
Use  of network cliques of related firms  as  the unit of observation in 
measuring  aggregate  concentration is  an outgrowth of the  interest group 
model. 3  The  premise  is that the  strength and stability of interlocking 
directors  over  time  suggest that they reflect working relationships between 
firms  and  are established in order  to  secure  regular  forums  for  exchange  of 
information.  This  interfirm structural organization may  integrate decision 
making  to  a  significant degree.  Network clique based measures  of aggregate 
concentration provide  a  concrete means  of capturing this  integration. 
Conventional  firm based measures  that cannot  gauge  this effect are likely to 
underestimate  the relative importance of large scale enterprise. 
3Network cliques are  an application of network analysis;  an  emerging 
conceptual  framework  and set of empirical methods  for  analyzing  the  complex 
sets of relational data found  in the  social sciences  (see,  e.g.,  Knoke  and 
Kuklinski  (1982)). 
3 The  potential bias  involved can be  shown by  a  simple  example  involving an 
economy  made  up  of ten firms ,  each with  the market  share  shown  in Table  1. 
If interfirm organizations  or network cliques  are  ignored,  the  aggregate  four 
firm  share  (CR4)  is  70%  and  the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index  (H-index )  is 1650. 
Now  suppose  that the decision making  of  the  second,  fourth,  and sixth firms  is 
integrated so  that  they  form  a  clique.  The  other  s even  firms  do  not have  such 
links  and  remain  independent  as  one  member  cliques .  Using  the  network clique 
as  the unit of observation,  the  aggregate  CR4  in the  economy  is  80%  and  the  H-
index is  2350.  Thus  failure  to  recognize  linkages  between  firms  that 
compromise  their independent  operation will systematically underestimate "the 
relative  importance  of large scale enterprise  in an  economy. 
Network  clique based measures  of aggregate  concentration require  an 
ordered list of  large  scale enterprises that combines  closely related firms. 
This  grouping  may  be based on stockholding,  interlocking directors,  or  a 
combination  of  these  and other factors.  The  next section presents  two  methods 
of grouping based  on  the  number  and  intensity of the  firm's  interlocking 
directors .  The  final  section compares  firm  and clique based measures  of 
aggregate  concentration for  a  sample  of agribusiness  firms . 
III .  Use  of Full and Strong Directional Network Cliques  in 
Measures  of Aggregate  Concentration 
Interlocks between  firms  represent varying degrees  of integration  of 
decision making.  The  taking  of  a  seat on  the board of firm  B  by  the chief 
executive officer of  firm  A,  for  example,  represents  a  conscious  decision by 
the  two  corporations  to  establish a  formal  link.  This  CEO  may  also sit on  the 
board of  C  creating a  coincidental  interlock between Band C.  Many  other 
coincidental  interlocks are  created by prominent people  who  are not  firm 
4 Table  1.  Comparison  of  Firm  and  Network  Clique  Based Measures  of 
Aggregate  Concentration. 
Firm as  Unit  of Observation  Network  Clique  as  Unit of Observation 
Firm  Number  % Market 
1  30 
2  20 
3  10 
4  10 
5  5 
6  5 
7  5 
8  5 
9  5 
10  5 
CR4  70% 
H-index  1650 





















Share officers but sit on multiple boards  of directors  (e.g.,  representatives  of 
philanthropic organizations).  Thus  both  the  content of (i.e.,  who  makes  the 
link)  as  well  as  the  number  of interlocks  are  important  factors  in identifying 
network cliques  that represent integration of decision making between  firms. 
Identification of network cliques based  on  interlocks  involves  a  three 
step process:  definition of the  universe of firms,  enumeration of interlocks 
between universe  firms,  and  grouping of firms  into cliques based on 
interlocks.  The  universe  is defined broadly  enough  to  include all firms  and 
organizations  that are likely to be  significant participants  in the  network. 
For measuring  economy  wide  aggregate  concentration,  for  example,  a  universe 
including manufacturing,  banking,  life insurance,  utility,  retail trade,  and 
transportation firms  is desirable. 
Enumeration of interlocks  requires  listing and matching  the  officers  and 
directors  of all members  of the universe.  The  set of matches  or  interlocks  is 
the basic data for network models  that group  related firms  into cliques.  The 
model  and  algorithm for  this  grouping presented here  was  developed by 
researchers at SUNY-Stony  Brook4  and  is described in detail in Caswell  (1987). 
Its use  to  generate  an alternative measure  of aggregate  concentration is  a 
novel  application of this  model. 
The  model  uses  relational data on director interlocks  to  generate 
centrality scores  (ci)  for  each of the  firms  in the universe  or network. 
These  scores  can be  informally thought of as  a  measure  of popularity.  A 
firm's  centrality score is based on who  it interlocks with and  the  intensity 
of its interlocks.  The  general  form  of  the centrality measure  for  firm  i  is 
4See  Bearden et al.(1975),  Mariolis  (1975),  Mizruchi(1982) ,  and Mintz  and 
Schwartz  (1985). 
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where  rij  is  intensity of the  link between  firm  i  and j,  Cj  is centrality of 
firm j,  and  N  is number  of firms  in network.  Thus  a  firm's  centrality score 
is  a  weighted  summation of the  intensity of its board interlocks with other 
firms  where  the weights  are  the centrality scores  of the  interlocking firms . 
The  weights  allow for  links with different degrees  of importance.  A  link to  a 
highly  interconnected firm that has  a  relatively high centrality score,  for 
example,  will contribute more  to  a  firm's  centrality score  than  a  link to  a 
firm that is weakly  connected. 
Two  measures  of rij'  the  intensity of the  link between  two  firms,  are 
defined.  These  distinguish between the set of all interlocks  and  the subset 
that is more  likely to  represent  integration of decision making between firms. 
The  two  definitions  form  the basis  for  identification of full  and strong 
directional network cliques. 
Under  the full network definition,  rij  is based on  the  set of all 





where bij  is number  of board members  in common,  di is number  of members  on 
board of firm i,  and  dj  is number  of members  on board of firm j.S  The 
numerator  is  the  number  of  interlocking directors between the  two  firms  while 
SThe  rij  measures  rely on  interlocking board membership .  Thus  firms 
with no  board (i.e.,  cases where  di or dj  equals  zero~  are  excluded  from  the 
analysis. 
7 the  denomi nator  controls  f or  the  potential  number  of  interlockers  from  each 
firm. 
The  s t rong  directional network definition of rij  is  more  stringent; 
i ncludi ng  only board interlocks  made  by  an officer of one  of the  interlocked 
firms .  As  noted,  these  ties represent  a  conscious  decision to  associate  and 
are  more  likely to  involve  some  degree  of integration of decision making. 
In  addition,  in this  measure  rij  is  defined  so  that  the  firm  sending  the 
i nterlock  (the  officer's home  firm)  gets  the bulk of the  increase  in 
centrality scores  due  to  the  link while  the  receiving firm  gets  the balance. 
This  formulation recognizes  that the direction of the  interlock indicates  the 
f low  of influence between the  two  corporations. 
Formally,  in the  strong directional network rij  is defined as 
(3) 
where  Sij  is number  of officers of firm  i  who  sit on  the board of firm  j 
(sending),  tij  is number  of officers of firm  j  who  sit on  the board of firm  i 
(receiving),  Ws  is weight of sender,  Wr  is weight of receiver,  and  Ws  +  Wr 
equals  1. 6 
The  full  and  strong directional networks  are  each  a  set of N  simultaneous 
equa t i ons  in the  matrix  form: 
C =  RC  (4) 
where  C  is  an  Nxl  vector of centrality scores  and  R  is an  NxN  matrix of the 
6Followi ng  Bearden et al.  (1975)  and Mizruchi  (1982),  Ws  is set at  .9 
and  W r  at  . 1  in the  application that follows. 
8 full  (Equation  2)  or  strong directional  (Equation  3)  overlap  measure  rij.7 
The  centrality scores calculated by  each  set of equations  are  used  to  rank 
corporations  in the network  from most  to  least central. 
An  algorithm called peak analysis  is  then  employed  to  group  related firms 
into cliques based on  their own  centrality scores  and  the  scores  of firms  with 
which  they are  interlocked.  In this process,  a  firm  is defined as  a  peak,  or 
the  most  central firm  in a  clique,  if all other firms  it is  interlocked with 
are less central than it (i.e.,  have  lower centrality scores).  A  firm  is 
defined as  a  member  of the  clique associated with  a  peak firm if all firms 
more  central than it that it is  interlocked with are also  members  of that 
clique.  Formally: 
Ei  f  0  iff V j, rij  f  0  +  ci >  Cj  (5) 
j  £  Ei iff V  k,  rjk f  0  and  ck >  Cj  +  K  e:  Ei  (6) 
where  Ei  is  the clique associated with firm i,  rij  is  the measure  of overlap 
(rij  =  0  if there are no  interlocks),  and ci is the centrality of firm i. 
Under  peak analysis,  a  firm is identified as  a  member  of a  clique  (including 
peaks),  a  mixed member  of more  than one  clique,  or an isolate that maintains 
no  interlocks with other firms  in the network. 
7The  system of equations  C  =  RC,  or  (R-I)C  =  0  has  a  nonzero  solution 
only under  the unlikely condition that deteR-I)  =  O.  But  Bonacich  (1972) 
shows  that multiplying the left side by  a  constant  A,  does  not violate the 
spirit of the  model  and  allows  a  solution to  the  equations.  The  system  AC=RC 
is  solved by  finding  eigenvalues  and eigenvectors.  Here, A is  chosen  to  equal 
the  largest eigenvalue;  the  elements  of its related eigenvector are  the 
centrality scores.  Since  the  system has  one  more  unknown  than equations,  the 
actual values  of the  centrality scores  are arbitrary.  The  scores  are  chosen 
so  that  the most  central  firm has  a  score of 1.0;  therefore,  the  scores  range 
from  0  to  1.0. 
9 Two  alternative measures  result from  use  of full  and  strong directional 
cliques,  respectively,  as  the  unit  of observation in calculations  of aggregate 
concentration.  In both cases,  a  new  ranking of the  largest enterprises  in an 
economy  or  sector of  the  economy  is generated by  combining  the  assets,  sales, 
or other relevant  economic variables  of clique members.  Firms  that are  mixed 
members  of more  than  one  clique or  isolates  are not  grouped  and  appear  in the 
ranking as  independent  entities.  Commonly  used measures  of aggregate 
concentration such  as  CRK,  H-index,  and  the  numbers  equivalent Herfindahl-
Hirschman  Index  (NH-index)  can then be  computed for  the  new  rankings .  These 
clique based numbers  are alternative,  and arguably more  accurate,  measures  of 
aggregate  concentration and  the relative  importance  of large scale enterprise. 
In the next sectiqn,  conventional  and alternative measures  of aggregate 
concentration  are  compared for  a  sample  of agribusiness  firms . 
IV.  An Application to  the Agribusiness  Sector 
The  agribusiness  sector of  the u.S  economy  includes  agricultural input 
manufacturers  (machinery,  feed,  chemicals),  cooperatives  (supply  and 
marketing),  food manufacturers,  restaurant chains,  wholesalers  and retailers . 
For  this application,  a  sample  of  212  of the  largest firms  operating in these 
industries  in 1976  is used. 8  Since  the population of firms  is truncated to 
include  only  the  largest firms  in the agribusiness  sector,  the  aggregate 
concentration figures  reported here  are measures  of relative size  among  the 
8These  212  are  a  subset of a  list of  222  agribusiness  firms  created by 
the  Corporate  Data  Exchange  (CDE)  in the publication of the  CDE  Stock 
Ownership  Directory--Agribusiness  (1979).  Ten of the  222  firms  were  excluded 
from  the  analysis because  data on their board membership  could not be  found. 
A  complete list of  the  sample  firms  is available  from  the  author. 
10 largest firms  and enterprises  rather  than  among  all firms  and enterprises  in 
the  sector. 
The  universe  of firms  used  in the network clique analysis  is defined  to 
include  the  212  agribusiness  firms  plus all firms  that had  a  stockholding of 
at least 0 . 5%  in one  of the  agribusiness  firms  as  of 1976.  There were  216 
such stockholders  according to  the  CDE  Stock Ownership  Directory--Agribusiness 
(1979) .  They  are  included in the universe because  their stockholdings  make 
them likely participants  in the sector's network of contacts.  In addition, 
the universe  includes  a  group  of  27  Fortune  Top  Fifty commercial banks  and 
life insurance  companies  that were  not agribusiness  stockholders.  They  are 
included in order  to  cover  the  largest of these  two  types  of  firms 
comprehensively.  Thus  the network analyzed includes  455  firms. 
The  names  of the officers  and directors of the  455  network members  were 
coded and matched,  using biographical sources  for  confirmation when  needed. 
Under both network definitions,  maintenance  of interlocking directors was 
common  among  the  agribusiness  firms .  In the full network with all interlocks 
counted,  163  (76.9%)  of the  212  agribusiness  firms  are  interlocked with at 
least one  other member  of the network while  49  (23.1%)  are isolates.  In the 
strong directional network with only  interlocks  made  by officers counted,  145 
(68.4%)  are  interlocked with at least one  other firm while  67  (31.6%)  are 
isolates. 
Centrality scores were  computed and cliques  identified in the  full  and 
strong directional networks.  The  degree  of aggregation of individual  firms 
into  cliques  differs quite dramatically between  the  two  networks  (see  Table 
2).  In the  strong directional network,  a  total of  205  firms  belong  to  64 
11 Table  2.  Distribution of Firms  Among  Cliques  of Different Sizes,  Mixed 
Members,  and  Isolates  in Strong Directional  and  Full Networks. 
Total  Firms  in 
Number  of Firms  Number  of  This  Category 
Network  Type  in Cligue  Cligues  Number  Percent 
Strong Directional: 
Firms  in Cliques  25  1  25  5.5 
22  1  22  4.8 
12  1  12  2.6 
11  1  11  2.4 
10  1  10  2.2 
8  2  16  3.5 
6  1  6  1.3 
5  1  5  1.1 
4  4  16  3.5 
3  7  21  4.6 
2  17  34  7.5 
1  27  27  5.9 
Clique  Subtotal  64  205  45.1 
Mixed Members  103  22.6 
Isolates  147  32.3 
Total  64  455  100.0 
Full: 
Firms  in Cliques  354  1  354  77 . 8 
2  5  10  2.2 
Clique  Subtotal  6  364  80.0 
Mixed  Members  0  0.0 
Isolates  91  20.0 
Total  6  455  100.0 
12 cliques  ranging  in size  from  25  down  to  a  single  member. 9  An  additional 103 
firms  are  mixed members  of more  than  one  clique while  147  firms  are  isolates. 
The  full network,  on  the  other hand,  yields  a  much  more  centralized clique 
structure.  Only  6  cliques  are  identified with  no  fewer  than  354  of  the  firms 
belonging to  a  single  large clique.  The  5  other cliques have  2  members  each, 
there are  no  mixed members,  and  91  firms  are  isolates. 
Agribusiness  firms  belong  to  51  of the  64  cliques  identified in the 
strong directional network  (see Table  3).  Sixty of the  212  firms  belong  to  13 
cliques  that have  more  than one  agribusiness  member. 10  For  the alternative 
measure  of aggregate  concentration,  the  operating revenues  or assets of 
agribusiness  firms  that belong to  the  same  clique are  added  to  form  one  large 
scale enterprise.  Therefore,  these  60  firms  are  combined  to  form  13  large 
scale enterprises.  The  remaining  152  agribusinesses  are members  of cliques 
with only one  agribusiness  firm,  mixed members  of more  than  one  clique,  or 
isolates.  These  firms  are  counted as  individual enterprises.  Thus  the  strong 
directional network produces  an ordered ranking of a  total of 165  large scale 
enterprises  (13  cliques plus  152  independently ranked  firms). 
The  full network's  less discriminating definition of linkage  (i.e.,  its 
inclusion of all interlocks regardless  of how  they are  made)  results  in 
dramatically higher levels of combination of firms  in cliques,  as  was  noted 
above.  While  agribusiness  firms  belong  to  5  of the  6  identified cliques,  only 
2  of these have  more  than one  agribusiness  firm  (see Table  3).  Fully 158  of 
9These  single  firm  cliques have  no  members  other  than the peak because 
the  other  firms  interlocked with  the  peak are mixed  members  of more  than  one 
clique  and  cannot be  assigned to  any  single peak. 
10Respectively,  these  13  cliques had 9,  8,  6,  6,  6,  5,  5,  4,  3,  2,  2,  2, 
and  2  agribusiness  firms  as  members. 
13 Table  3.  Distribution of Agribusiness  Firms  Among  Cliques,  Mixed  Members,  and 
Isolates,  and  Number  of Large  Scale Agribusiness  Enterprises  in 
Strong Directional  and  Full  Networks. 
Network  Type 
Strong Directional: 
Full: 
Cliques with> 1  agribusiness  firms 
Cliques  with  1  agribusiness  firm 
Mixed  members 
Isolates 
Total 
Cliques with> 1  agribusiness  firms 
Cliques with  1  agribusiness  firm 
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54 the  212  agribusinesses  are  added  to  form  one  large scale enterprise while  2 
others belong to  a  separate enterprise .  The  remaining  52  firms  are  members  of 
cliques with only  one  agribusiness  firm  or  isolates .  Both are  counted as 
individual enterprises .  Thus  the full network produces  an  ordered ranking of 
a  total of  54  large scale enterprises  (2  cliques  plus  52  independently ranked 
firms). 
Conventional  and alternative measures  of aggregate  concentration for  the 
sample  of agribusiness  firms  are  compared  in Table  4.  Since results  may  vary 
depending  on  the  measure  of size used  (Shalit and  Sankar  (1977»,  these 
comparisons  are presented for both operating revenues  and assets  for  three 
commonly  used measures  of concentration:  CRK,  H-index,  and NH-index. 
Columns  1  and  4  of Table  4  show results  for  conventional measures  of aggregate 
concentration based on  the  firm as  the unit of observation.  The  remaining 
columns  present alternative measures  based on  the  strong directional clique 
(columns  2  and  5)  and the full network clique  (columns  3  and  6)  as  the unit of 
observation. 
The  CRK  measures  for  operating revenues  with  the  strong directional 
clique as  the unit of observation are  on average  about  11  percentage points 
higher  than the  firm based figures.  When  full network cliques are  the unit 
of observation,  aggregate  concentration rises by  about  60  points  on average. 
This  is  a  dramatic  increase with  the  top  10  large enterprises accounting for 
about  95%  of operating revenues.  The  CRK  measures  for assets  (Columns  4 
through  6)  display the  same  pattern with average  increases  of  9  points for  the 
strong directional  and  54 points  for  the full  network measures.  The  impact  of 
using cliques  as  the unit of observation on H-index  and NH-index measures  of 
aggregate  concentration are  shown at the bottom of Table  4.  As  with  eRK, 
15 Table 4.  Conventional am Al  ternati  ve Measures of Aggregate Concentration 
Arocmg  Large Agribusiness Finns,  1976. 
Operatinq Revenues 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
With strong 
Directional  With Full 
All Finns  Network  Network  All Finns 
Independent  Cliques  Cliques  Independent 
CRlO  27.6  36.7  94.6  33.1 
CR25  46.2  60.3  97.7  54.1 
CRSO  65.5  78.7  73.1 
CRlOO  85.6  93.9  91.5 
H-index  148  210  7455  180 
NH-index  68  48  1  55 
16 
Assets 
(5)  (6) 
With strong 
Directional  With Full 
Network  Network 
Cliques  Cliques 
39.9  97.3 
66.4  98.7 
84.1 
96.5 
239  8268 
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these measures  show  increases  in aggregate  concentration with  use  of str ong 
directional cliques  and very dramatic  increases with full network cliques . 
This  application to  the  agribusiness  sector provides  a  gauge,  however 
rough,  of the magnitude  of the underestimation of aggregate concentration 
resulting from  assuming  that firms  are  independently  owned  and  operated. 
Recognition of interfirm organizational structures,  through  the  device of 
strong directional and full network cliques,  yields higher aggregate 
concentration numbers.  The  percentage  increase  depends  on  the  concentration 
measure  and clique  type used.  The  strong directional measures  show  more 
modest  increases ranging  from  a  5.5%  increase for  CR100  measured by assets  to 
a  41.9%  increase for  the H-index measured by operating revenues.  The 
percentage  increases  in the full network measures  are  much higher  ranging  from 
82.4%  for  CR25  based on assets  to nearly  5000%  for  the H-index based on 
operating revenues. 
The  true level of underestimation probably lies  somewhere within the 
range  defined by  the  strong directional clique measures.  While  the  strong 
directional network definition is relatively conservative  in grouping  firms 
into cliques,  the full network definition undoubtedly errs  in the  opposite 
direction.  The  single large,  national clique that dominates  the full network 
is much  too  loosely knit to be  considered a  single large enterprise.  The 
cliques  in the  strong directional network,  on the  other hand,  represent 
plausible  groupings.  Focusing  on  CRK  with strong directional cliques,  the 
underestimation of aggregate  concentration by use of conventional measures  is 
on average  11  points  (23%)  for  operating revenues  and  9  points  (16%)  f or 
assets.  The  percentage underestimation based on H-index  and NH-index 
measures  range  from  24%  to  42%.  Thus  underestimation of aggregate 
17 j, 
concentration on  the  order  of 15%  to  40%  is suggested by  this application to 
the  agribusiness  sector. 
The  degree  of underestimation in other sectors  and  the  economy  as  a  whole 
is  a  subject for  further  empirical  research.  In any  case,  alternative 
measures  of aggregate  concentration such as  those  developed here promise  more 
accurate  appraisals  of the relative  importance  of large scale enterprise  in 
the U.S.  economy. 
18 .  ,' 
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